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Gerry Canavan 
Review of Laurence A. Rickels, I Think I Am: Philip K. Dick, Minneapolis: University of 




 In the last part of his three-volume study Nazi Psychoanalysis (2002), Laurence A. 
Rickels established a definition for what he calls “psy fi”: that overlapping cultural nexus where 
science fiction, psychoanalysis, psychosis, psychological warfare, and the growing 
technologization of the self all meet and begin to merge with one another. As suggested by the 
title of the larger project, Psy Fi takes “Germanicity” as the horizon of futurity, not only as “the 
open book of evil politics”—all our contemporary dystopias transfigured mediations on Nazi 
Germany—but also in the sense that “investments to this day in maintaining the good war as 
ongoing frame of reference necessarily require that Nazi Germany keep on winning.” American 
geopolitical ascendency requires the dead Nazi threat as its uncanny double, its vitalizing, 
justifying other. In this way “psy fi” employs Germany as a token both of the past and of the 
future, as well as a hidden shadow of the present. 
Now, in I Think I Am: Philip K. Dick, Rickels applies this proposed super-genre to an 
exhaustive survey of the legendary writer of science fiction. Reading only the words “psy fi,” 
one immediately thinks of Dick, whose voluminous body of work is defined by precisely these 
sorts of paranoid speculations, divided selves, psychotic breaks, and reality breakdowns—as well 
as by a lifelong preoccupation both with the Nazis and with Germanicity more generally. 
Rickels’s title, an obvious play on Descartes’s famous cogito, functions as a summary of the 
overawing thematic preoccupation that crops up time and time again in Dick, well past the point 
of obsession: “I think I am (but I really can’t be sure).” But, as Rickels admits with some 
professed embarrassment in the first pages of I Think I Am, he began reading Dick only quite 
late. Having been told for so long that he absolutely must be drawing his ideas from Dick’s 
fiction, Rickels, in a kind of transparent reaction formation, for decades refused to read him at 
all.  Now broken down, Rickels makes up for lost time by reading all of Dick, touching on 
almost every one of Dick’s published and unpublished novels over the course of I Think I Am’s 
400 pages. And this of course is the second pun embedded in Rickels’s evocative title: a tight, 
even excessive identification with Dick (“I think I am Philip K. Dick”). 
Over the years that Rickels refused to read Dick his position in the culture at large has 
grown considerably. At least a dozen of his novels and stories have been adapted into films like 
Blade Runner, Total Recall, and Minority Report, with at least a dozen other unacknowledged, 
quasi-plagiarized descendents. Fredric Jameson’s once extravagant characterization of Dick as 
“the Shakespeare of science fiction” now seems prescient in both aspects: not only has Dick 
come to stand almost unchallenged within the realm of science fiction literature as the master of 
the form, but his works have earned increasing stature within the mainstream literary canon as 
well. The Library of America has published his thirteen most important novels in three hardcover 
volumes, the first such release for a writer of science fiction. A generally obscure writer of 
science fiction novels during his lifetime—well-known in science fiction and counterculture 
circles, but largely unknown outside these groups—Dick is now among the best known and most 
studied writers of his generation, making frequent appearances on contemporary literature syllabi 
in English departments and “best of” lists in the popular press. 
Dick presents significant interpretative problems for critics. Forty-five years after Roland 
Barthes declared the death of that slippery and inscrutable figure, the Author, the Author 
nevertheless persists at the center of critical practice. And Dick’s tumultuous personal life 
frequently intrudes upon the autonomy of his literary works, almost to the point of exclusion: his 
lifelong preoccupation with his twin sister, who died in infancy; his many troubled relationships, 
including five marriages; his drug use; his various psychiatric diagnoses, none of which is 
wholly satisfying or sufficiently explanatory; and most importantly the hallucinogenic “VALIS 
experience” that Dick would spend the last decade of his life futilely trying to unravel. VALIS 
(“Vast Active Living Intelligence System”) was Dick’s name for an entity which he believed 
contacted him in February and March of 1974, a belief that was eventually translated to his 
religious VALIS trilogy and which today is understood as a genuine mystical experience, a full-
on psychotic break, and an amusing, self-conscious literary hoax—or perhaps all three—
depending on which of Dick’s critics one asks. The problem of studying Philip K. Dick is little 
different today than it was in 1975, when Stanislaw Lem wrote that (in contrast with most 
authors, or Authors) “Philip K. Dick does not lead his critics an easy life, since he does not so 
much play the part of a guide through his phantasmagoric worlds as he gives the impression of 
one lost in their labyrinth.” Critical readers of Dick frequently become unmoored between 
attempts to use psychiatric diagnosis to unlock the secret of Dick’s novels and attempts to use 
Dick’s novels to unlock the secret of his diagnosis. 
Rickels’s take on this problem is a clever one: he seeks to return diagnosis-making 
agency to Dick himself. Because “the unhousing or unhinging of reality—the crisis of 
uncanniness” requires a singular subject/mind to “be legible as world,” Rickels “gives priority to 
the legible borderline passing through psychosis along which Dick unfolds his thought 
experiments on the way to giving them form.” But what ultimately makes Dick’s writing “psy fi” 
is not just the presence of this metaphysical and metapsychological themes but also, crucially, 
self-analysis, the key discursive mode that unites science fiction, psychoanalysis, and memoirs of 
psychosis. Rickels attempts to find his way out of Dick’s labyrinth by focusing on Dick as the 
agent of his own psychoanalysis, which means returning to those theoretical and practical studies 
in psychoanalysis which “Dick would or could or should have read.” Thus, in the first part of the 
I Think I Am, we come at Dick (or out of Dick) through Daniel Paul Schreber’s Memoirs of My 
Nervous Illness, as well as through Freud’s reading of Schreber, as well as Dick’s reading of 
Freud. In Dick’s hands Schreber’s illness immediately becomes science fictionalized as perhaps 
not illness at all, but as potential contact with a macrocosmic world beyond empirical 
comprehension—precisely the move Dick himself makes with respect to his own VALIS 
experience. Dick’s is a world where, even if psy fi isn’t already real, it threatens to become so at 
any moment. 
Later chapters track Dick’s encounters—both as documented within his lectures and 
nonfiction writing and within the huge, largely unpublished personal journal called the Exegesis 
which housed Dick’s philosophical and psychological speculations about VALIS, as well as only 
speculated by Rickels—with such thinkers as Carl Jung, Ludwig Biswanger, and Gotthard 
Günther, as well as Hegel, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jameson, and Derrida (in one literary-
philosophical register) and Faust, Tolkien, Asimov, and The Matrix (in another). Note, crucially, 
the prominence of Germans on that list; Rickels reveals Dick as a kind of amateur Germanist.  
At times Dick himself recedes into the background of Rickels’s study, seemingly 
forgotten, only to reemerge time and again in a new novelistic discourse on psychoanalytic 
themes. For Rickels Dick becomes less a novelist than a companion theorist, working through 
the same issues in a (semi-)fictional mode, employing science fictional tropes like precogs, 
andys, and half-life to poke at the limits of experience and self-knowledge in the hopes of 
ultimately passing beyond. 
In pursuit of this metaphysical transcendence I Think I Am provides little in the way of 
traditional argumentative signposting, offering up no single “big idea” and relying instead on 
loose thematic groupings for its organizational logic. Its free-flowing, winding, seemingly 
undirected path—combined with Rickels’s writerly penchant for allusion, quotation, puns and 
wordplay, and autobiographical diversion—results in a volume that is almost useless as an 
introduction to either Dick or modern psychoanalytic theory but incredibly useful for scholars 
already familiar with these concepts and looking for new insights and a novel approach. The 
gathering of Rickels’s wide-ranging, encyclopedic archive is by itself an important contribution 
to scholarship, completely independent of his smart readings of Dick and psychoanalysis. 
In fact barriers to entry are in some sense a deliberately crafted feature of the text. 
Rickels writes with a confidence that one has read his other works—and the work on which that 
other works is based, and the work on which that is based—that can alienate the novice. 
Likewise, Rickels’s own style can at times be quite alienating, especially before one has grown 
used to it. In his introduction to Psy Fi, Benjamin Bennett suggests that Rickels’s unique style 
should be thought of neither as theory nor as practice, but as performance—as, indeed, a kind of 
tour de force of association, elaboration, expansion, and improvisation. This is something like 
criticism in the mode of the novel, or (better) perhaps dramatic monologue. “In other words, as 
long as you expect Rickels to do something for you—to teach you, to improve you, to take you 
somewhere—as long as you insist on something ‘positive,’ you will be disappointed,” Bennett 
notes. The journey is itself the destination. “You are never going to have all of this book anyway. 
The way you in fact are, as yourself, named, scarred, broken, accidental, radically compromised, 
like modernity itself, is how this book wants its reader, and how you, the reader, want the book.”  
This aesthetic is, if anything, even more operative in I Think I Am than in Nazi 
Psychoanalysis. Notably, the book has neither a conclusion nor a proper introduction; it has, 
rather, an “introjection,” suggesting both an interruption/intervention into a discourse that is 
already ongoing as well as the psychological process by which the subject internalizes thoughts 
and habits from others into oneself. Rickels clearly introjects Dick, in both senses; likewise, we 
as readers introject Rickels, entering this book without a roadmap and thus becoming completely 
beholden to its whims and flows—riding a wave of thought that belongs a third to Rickels, a 
third to Dick, and a third to modernity itself. In this way I Think I Am is perhaps best read, 
unexpectedly, as the true object of its own self-analysis, Rickels in the end replicating Dick’s 
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